Wednesday, December 30, 2009

macro-physics! - Latour and plasma

I wanted to respond off-the-cuff because Mike, in his usual sharp manner, raises exactly the thematic concerns that have been bothering me lately. My concerns are currently circulating around intentionality, Harmanesque broad intentionality at that, transcendentalism/autonomy/subjecthood, and arising from Harman’s response to my reading of the vicarious causation essay the possibility of a hermeneutics of objects. All this has been buttressed for me by an attempt to engage with Žižek which has more or less confirmed to me that Žižek most clearly represents all that object oriented thinking rejects. So I must admit it is a little bitter-sweet to discover that Latour has already beaten me to the punch (at least in extending the range of hermeneutics) with the following quote:
“Hermeneutics is not a privilege of humans but, so to speak, a property of the world itself.”

Mike is right to wager that I’d find myself at odds with this, but this all depends on how Latour is using the word hermeneutics. If it is meant, and I suspect this is not the case, that Latour means the art of interpretation is a ‘property’ (and this is an awkward use of the word property) of the world then we might be treading in dangerous waters - from the charge of anthropocentricism to the Kantian limitation that one is here speaking about something beyond the phenomenal realm of experience. It is more likely that Latour means to draw out the classical (and indeed sacred...another subtle Latourian theme) meaning of hermeneutics as ἑρμηνεύω or translate. Re-working the quote along these lines one could then state that ‘Translation is not a privilege of humans but, so to speak, a property of the world itself.” This line would, in turn, be classically Latourian – perhaps even mundanely so.

Moving to the conceptual I find it difficult to understand what hermeneutics as a property of the world could possibly mean. This remains, at least for me, the leap of faith moment from the phenomeno[al]logical onto some immanent plane that I admit I cannot yet picture (and ought we to picture it or not?). Latour in his paper on philosophy admits that he harbours a secret desire to piece together a philosophical system and Harman has already argued that something metaphysical is in place in Latour. Mike notes that one of the strengths of Latour is precisely his willingness to admit metaphysical consequences into his work. If the plasma is anything to go by Latour is deeply metaphysical.

The plasma, as Mike points out, is something entailed by Latourian analysis (if I have him right here). Since ANT works on the premise of networks across an immanent or flat plane then one is left with the metaphysical problem that not all actors are always active (perhaps literally or perhaps they are not active in the phenomenal realm of experience – hence the transcendent aspect) and if this is the case one must deduce something like a plasma in order to account for this fact [arising from the ANT mode of analysis (entailed by it as such)]. This Mike sees as a kind of deficiency in the general mode of micro-analysis, the natural home of ANT and the social sciences generally, and opens up the necessary for a macro-analysis (macro-physics!). Of course this all smacks of metaphysical broadening, abstraction and associated un-Latourian nastiness and not the good old messiness we seek.
Yet the plasma is simply that which is “...not yet formatted, not yet measured, not yet socialized, not yet engaged in metrological chains, and not yet covered, surveyed, mobilized, or subjectified” which is not a radically new improvement upon the Hegelian ‘for us’ schema (the plasma is that which is not yet for self-consciousness but will be at some point in the sweep of things) or, alas, Heideggerian equipmental usage (the plasma is the background of things not yet in use). Yet we do have some ways to opt-out here: we can consider the unformatted as having Harmanesque lives of their own, with their own intentionality that is available, at some points but not always, for some human disclosure. The necessity of the plasma also nicely ties in with Harman’s real objects which are logically entailed by his analysis rather than encountered in (phenomenal) experience.

Of course this all works at a deeply conceptual (even metaphysical level) and I suspect that despite this being the natural territory of the philosopher it might require a Heideggerian leap on the part of the social scientist.

5 comments:

Michael said...

This is great--I wanted to provide a little bit of a segue into Harman, linking my more general (macro indeed) concerns to the tighter philosophical ones we'll be zeroing in on. In short, plasma seemed to be one major way to transition from Latour to Harman, showing where they become distinct from each other or diverge.

Anonymous said...

From my own standpoint, I have one observation/question about 'plasma'.

If it is an immanent substratum, a reservoir, which holds together networks of actors, something which *is* 'not hidden simply unknown' (mutatis mutandis, the same conception fo 'essence' which Harman holds, with the difference that he seeks it in single objects and not in a streaming plasma) and something which is the condition of possibility for an hermeneutics of the world, can we still call Latour a 'secular occasionalist'? How 'secular' is this necessity for a plasma? (More generally, I'm not sure that *any* occasionalism is ever non theologically flavoured)

Compare it,on the other hand, with a space of the 'not-yet' interpreted as that void which opens up the possibility of possibility, the space for a negative infinity for discontinuities and ruptures. It seems clear that 'plasma' is *not* this. Am I mistaken?

Michael said...

I definitely think it is not the not-yet. And I'm not sure we can call this space of the not-yet secular either though--at least from the Derridian perspective there's no assured way it could be so (I can't see how you can be sure--especially in a Meillassoux way--that there would be an infinity of these discontinuities). And while it seems we're all here working through Latour's Christian commitments (it's been a bit of a theme we've all been tracing--I mean to comment more on it explicitly in the future) I wouldn't say occasionalism always necessarily has to smack of theology. Moreover I don't really see why the line has to be drawn between secular/non-secular--other than that being the way the line has always been drawn. Maybe occasionalism is trying to draw the line differently, is all I'm saying. But I'm not as well versed in this as I should be...

It just seems to me that we can't quite map onto the logical deduction of objects the same problems that come up in the critiques of phenomenology in the last years. That's why I myself have been putting it all in terms of the methodology of ANT: when I say immanent I mean the writer of the study's immanence to the network, which is a more global problem. I think though that Paul's displacement of this phenomenology-critique problem (around the not hidden simply unknown) to Hegel and the for-us might represent an advance. So far all we have are the references to Kripke of Harman, which are good ways into this problem but for some reason aren't quite satisfying people.

I don't mean to take the precise problem you write about and move it into larger ones, but it strikes me that Paul has something up his sleeve here that makes sense to him but also displaces the whole issue in a large way.

Anonymous said...

Yes, I was employing 'secular' in a 'strategic' way, also because 'secular occasionalism' is Harman's own terminology. What I probably mean by 'secular' is atheist, and I have in my mind Hagglund's 'atheist' reading of Derrida indeed.

Anyway, yes it is my long(er) term plan to seek whether or not there are hidden theological themes (very loosely intended) both in Latour *and* in OOP as a whole, for the sake of an opening to comparative philosophy.

Michael said...

I figured as much--Hagglund's is a good reading of Derrida, that's for sure... but as much as I have sympathy with it (I'm not into mixing philosophy with religion), I think it's a bit reactive (in that it just corrects what what people invested in the "ethical turn" in comp. lit. and elsewhere have done to Derrida, which I think was stupid--i.e. its relevance is in the States and in correcting legacy of misinterpretation). His replies to Meillassoux I think are actually spot on though. I just wonder if Derrida himself displaced that secular/non-secular binary...

Regardless, I have to look more at why Harman calls Latour's occasionalism "secular,"--and for that matter, why its called an "occasionalism" at all as opposed to what I'm calling it, which is less metaphysical and just a sort of suspicious requirement of the way of proceeding which extends the relationism (which Harman I think rightly calls into question) way too far.